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q EXEMPLARY LEGAL WRITING 2018 q
BOOKS

SEVEN RECOMMENDATIONS

G. Edward White† & Sarah A. Seo*
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court
(Harvard University Press 2018)
Richard Fallon likely did not plan the publication of this book to coincide
with the aftermath of the Kavanaugh hearings or the phrase “Obama judges or
Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges.” After all, the author has been
writing about legitimacy and the law for over a decade, and this book brings
together many of his ideas in previously published law review articles. But
the timing could not be better, all the more so for young scholars or those
otherwise new to Fallon’s writings who will appreciate an accessible account
for why and when Supreme Court decisions merit legitimacy even if we do
not agree with them. Fallon submits the argument — a bold one during these
polarized times, a reasonable one during any other — that no one theory of
interpretation can answer all constitutional questions and suggests that we
make room for valid disagreements; “moral legitimacy can exist along a spectrum,” he posits (167). In a similar tenor, Fallon proposes the “Reflective
Equilibrium Hypothesis” that allows Supreme Court justices leeway to “refine and revise their methodological approaches on an ongoing basis” (170),
†
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which is a sensible recognition that smart and thoughtful individuals will,
and should, change their minds with new information. To enhance their
legitimacy, the justices simply need to be transparent and consistent about
their reflective equilibrium. Fallon claims that his proposals can promote
civil discourse and civil disagreement. Unfortunately, the book comes with
no guarantees.
Robert A. Ferguson
Metamorphosis:
How to Transform Punishment in America
(Yale University Press 2018)
Ferguson’s book is something of a sequel to his Inferno: An Anatomy of
American Punishment (2014), which precipitated an outpouring of letters to
him from people in prison. Metamorphosis uses those letters to construct a
vision of the experience of inmates in a prison system that features harsh,
long sentences and a culture of fear and degradation. He argues that the
original goal of a “penitentiary” system, rehabilitation of offenders through
opportunities to reflect upon and reconsider their past conduct, has nearly
vanished in the current obsession with using prisons as a means of simply
removing offenders from the population at large and “punishing” them
through indifferent and often cruel treatment.
The current atmosphere of prisons, Ferguson maintains, dehumanizes all
the participants in prison life. Prison officials focus almost exclusively on
discipline, tacitly permitting some prisoners to abuse others so long as a surface order is maintained. Guards are given nearly unlimited discretionary
authority over prisoners, resulting in a culture of callousness and brutality
and the self-selection of persons for guard positions who relish the exercise
of arbitrary power. Prisoners, facing long sentences and daily perturbations,
develop attitudes of fatalism and despair, undermining efforts at rehabilitation.
Violence against inmates is a constant background presence, resulting in
most inmates needing to spend the bulk of their time developing strategies
to protect themselves against attacks. The cumulative effect, Ferguson shows
through prison letters, is to make contemporary American prisons the equivalent of hellholes.
Ferguson is a reformer in the sense of wanting incarceration policies to
move away from using prisons as storehouses for offenders, in which the
inmates are simply housed out of sight of the general population with virtually no concern for their welfare, to a renewed emphasis on rehabilitation, in
which prison populations would be reduced (currently a large percentage of
inmates are incarcerated for non-violent crimes, such as drug use, but are
224
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mingled with violent offenders and serve what appear to be disproportionately long sentences) and genuine efforts would be made to allow inmates to
use prison as a basis for developing their faculties. But the strength of Metamorphosis comes not from particular reform proposals but from its power in
creating a narrative of prison as the equivalent of purgatory. When incarceration is used as a basis for simply forgetting about a resident population that
is consistently degraded, frightened, and isolated from redemptive human
contacts, something has gone radically wrong. The prison atmosphere that
Ferguson vividly creates, through the contributions of inmates who wrote
him about their experiences, is a powerful testament that America’s prison
policies having taken morally unjustifiable directions.
Issa Kohler-Hausmann
Misdemeanorland:
Criminal Courts and Social Control in an Age of Broken Windows Policing
(Princeton University Press 2018)
Alexandra Natapoff
Punishment without Crime:
How Our Massive Misdemeanor System Traps the Innocent and
Makes America More Unequal
(Basic Books 2018)
Misdemeanors are the underside of the iceberg of the criminal justice
system. Though these cases attract little attention, they make up the vast
proportion of criminal cases and profoundly determine what kind of justice
our criminal justice system dispenses. Even more, as Issa Kohler-Hausmann
and Alexandra Natapoff show, misdemeanor cases also reflect the health of
our democracy and even define the kind of society we have. Notwithstanding
some overlap between these two books, they complement each other in ways
that make it worth reading them together.
Misdemeanorland focuses on New York City’s courts to explain how the
processing of sub-felony cases exerts social control. In the 1990s, the city
adopted “broken windows policing,” which focused law enforcement’s efforts
on order maintenance. An expected consequence was a sharp uptick in the
number of misdemeanor arrests. An unexpected consequence was a sharp
decrease in the rate of convictions. By following how misdemeanor courts
handled the insurmountable caseload, Kohler-Hausmann discovered that they
simply did not adjudicate most cases. Instead, defense lawyers, prosecutors,
and judges fashioned a system to manage — discipline — defendants until
their cases could be resolved, often dismissed, without going through the
NUMBER 1 (2019)
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time-consuming and resource-draining procedures of formal adjudication.
Misdemeanorland concludes with a provocative question: What, exactly, is
wrong with the managerial model for non-felonious crimes? Does it not make
sense to assess whether low-level offenders can demonstrate rule-abiding
behavior over time without subjecting them to — and spending scarce resources on — the full-blown procedures and consequences that attend serious
crimes?
Natapoff’s own answer to this question is the focus of Punishment without
Crime. Both Natapoff and Kohler-Hausmann criticize mass misdemeanors
for entrenching class and racial inequalities in American society. Some parts
of Natapoff’s account may be familiar, such as the disregard for actual innocence in the processing of misdemeanors and the fines and fees that basically
add up to a regressive tax on minorities and the poor. But she goes on to
engage in a necessary discussion about why our democracy depends on reforms to the misdemeanor system, whether change is possible, and which
changes she would like to see.
Intriguingly, the chapter titled “History” comes in the middle of the book,
separating the chapters in the first half that describe the problem and the
later chapters that outline the reforms. This chapter traces the use of petty
offenses as a method of social control, beginning with the Jim Crow era, to
the postwar period of vagrancy policing, and finally to the decades of broken
windows policing. Natapoff’s takeaways from this history are somewhat in
tension. On the one hand, American society has for a long time used criminal
laws to oppress those on the margins of society. On the other hand, there
has been progress; broken windows policing is an improvement over vagrancy
policing, which is a far cry from the system of convict labor that essentially
reenslaved black Americans after the Civil War. In Punishment without
Crime, history provides context — today’s problems with race and criminal
justice are not new. It also offers guarded hope that although the struggle is
never ending, progressive change is possible.
Sarah E. Igo
The Known Citizen:
A History of Privacy in Modern America
(Harvard University Press 2018)
Privacy has a history, one that is broader than the legal histories often
told through Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s Harvard Law Review
article, “The Right to Privacy,” Griswold v. Connecticut, and Roe v. Wade.
“Privacy” as a concept has also entailed more than freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures, government surveillance, or data mining. According
226
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to Sarah Igo, thinking and arguing about privacy is a distinctly modern phenomenon that goes straight to heart of the meaning of citizenship itself.
Since the late 19th century, Americans have debated privacy in a wide range
of contexts, including public health, Social Security, scientific research, and
all the records that schools, government agencies, and private corporations
maintain. By expanding the inquiry, Igo masterfully sets forth the surprising
and complex stakes of being a “known citizen” in the 20th-century United
States. Privacy was never an unalloyed good that has been lost sometime in
the past few decades. Privacy has been, and continues to be, an unsettling
and difficult question precisely because fears about intrusions to our privacy
have always accompanied the desire to be visible as a rights-bearing, statusholding individual.
Jennifer E. Rothman
The Right of Publicity:
Privacy Reimagined for a Public World
(Harvard University Press 2018)
Rothman’s book makes two contributions. The first is to construct a narrative history of the “right of publicity,” now primarily understood as allowing
persons to capture the commercial value of their names or likenesses against
potential appropriation by others, as having spun off of the original common
law right of “privacy” in a fortuitous and not fully defensible fashion. The
core meaning of the action of common law privacy, as it developed in the
early 20th century, was protecting persons from having their names or likenesses made public without their consent for any reason. In early privacy
cases plaintiffs were not complaining that the publication of their images or
stories about them robbed them of the opportunity to capitalize on their
prospective fame or notoriety. They were claiming that they suffered humiliation and other forms of emotional harm simply because they did not want
their names or images, or incidents about them, exposed to the general public
at all. Their objection to the publicizing of information about them was
based on feelings that it was “humiliating” for young women to have their
portraits made part of commercial advertisements for flour, or it was misleading to place a photograph of an artist on an advertisement for insurance.
Neither of those plaintiffs was maintaining that they should have been paid
for the use of their likenesses. They were objecting to pictures of them being
displayed in public at all.
As the right of privacy expanded in the mid 20th century, a case came
before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in which one manufacturer of chewing gum sued another for allegedly unauthorized use of the
names and likenesses of major league ballplayers in “baseball cards” accomNUMBER 1 (2019)
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panying packets of gum. The suit was originally based on interference with
contract because the players had allegedly given one of the companies exclusive rights to use information about them and their careers for limited periods.
That issue was complicated because the players had assigned their rights to
third parties who had then assigned them to gum companies. The players
were paid nominal sums for the assignments, which were exclusive but of
short duration. A central issue in the case was whether the third parties were
able to assign the rights they had received from the players to other persons.
Although the case of Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum was understood by all the judges who decided it as an interference with contract
case, the question of assignability affected that issue, and at one point judges
for the Second Circuit concluded that the players had a “right of publicity”
that was personal to them and could only be assigned if they consented to
the assignment. That issue was not necessary to the case, because all of the
players had signed waivers of any rights they had to prevent third parties from
using their names or likenesses. The Second Circuit was also incorrect in
concluding that the common law right of privacy in New York encompassed
a “right of publicity”: there was no common law right of privacy in the state,
only a statute that prevented anyone’s using the name or likeness of an individual “for the purposes of business or trade” without the individual’s consent.
Nonetheless Haelan was read by other courts to have created a “right of
publicity” distinct from one of privacy, akin to an intellectual property right.
Over the decades after Haelan that reading was to have three significant implications. One was that rights of publicity, like other intellectual property rights,
were alienable: they could be transferred to other persons who could prevent
the commercial appropriation of someone’s name or likeness. A second was
that, subject to jurisdictional limitations, rights of publicity were inheritable:
the rights of entertainers to control the distribution of their names or likenesses could succeed to relatives. Finally, a Supreme Court decision in 1977,
in a case involving a news station’s broadcast of the entire ‘human cannonball”
act of a performer at a state fair, held that no First Amendment privileges
constrained rights of publicity. A performer could capture the value of his
“act,” and prevent others from rebroadcasting it without his consent, even if
it was “newsworthy.”
In this form the “right of publicity” has expanded, distorting the original
understanding of rights of privacy and arguably creating problems for persons
who want to creatively reproduce the names or likenesses of others. Rothman’s
second contribution is to suggest that in this capacity the right of publicity
arguably restrains creativity and places too much power in the hands of celebrities and their relatives, who simply want to get paid anytime someone else
228
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makes use of their names and likenesses. She points to several cases in which
celebrities successfully sued others for representations of their names and
likenesses when the representations were sufficiently “transformative” that
no one would have thought them simply an effort to make money on the
literal appropriation of a name or likeness. One case involved an advertisement
by Samsung featuring a robot dressed like the television performer Vanna
White which looked nothing like White, although it performed arguably
“robotic” functions similar to White’s turning the “Wheel of Fortune” board.
The ad was designed to communicate the message that Samsung electronic
devices would still be available when, in some future, robots might replace
humans as performers.
Rothman would disengage the “right of publicity” from privacy and seek
to restore the original thrust of disclosure privacy actions, where persons
sought simply to prevent public disclosure of information about them, or
their names or likenesses, without their consent. She argues that in an increasingly “public” world, whose inhabitants are besieged by social media and
other devices that serve to gratuitously publicize intimate details of their daily
lives, there is a need for a more robust version of disclosure privacy, and
“right of publicity” cases have amounted to establishing a doctrinally flawed
barrier to the emergence of that version.
Mary Ziegler
Beyond Abortion:
Roe v. Wade and the Battle for Privacy
(Harvard University Press 2018)
Ziegler’s book may be said to compliment Rothman’s in that both seek
to complicate “histories” of privacy in the 20th century. Whereas Rothman’s
history focuses on the concept of privacy in tort law, Ziegler’s focus is on
privacy as a constitutionally protected “right,” a form of “liberty” under the
Due Process Clauses. She shows how when Roe v. Wade came to the Court,
the idea of constitutional privacy rights in the area of reproduction was at a
high-water mark, with the Court’s Griswold and Eisenstadt decisions discovering a right of privacy that justified the unrestricted use of contraceptives in the
Constitution and extending it beyond married couples to individuals. Roe,
challenging efforts by the state of Texas to outlaw abortions, seemed a logical
next step, and so a Court majority grounded a woman’s choice to terminate
a pregnancy, up to certain times in a gestation cycle, in a “liberty” to make
decisions affecting reproduction and her body under the Due Process Clauses.
The choices to apply privacy rights to abortion decisions, to limit the
scope of unrestricted abortion choices to the early stages of a pregnancy, and
NUMBER 1 (2019)

229

G. EDWARD WHITE & SARAH A. SEO

to associate the abortion decision not only with the rights of pregnant women
but with their physicians turned out, Ziegler demonstrates, to make the Roe
decision far more controversial than it might have been. By treating the choice
to terminate a pregnancy as an individual right, but limiting the scope of that
choice to the early stages of a pregnancy because of a corresponding “right”
in a fetus, the decision galvanized persons on both sides of the abortion issue
and suggested that the Supreme Court was siding with “pro-choice” rather
than “pro-life” supporters, for reasons that did not seem wholly convincing to
many. The focus on individual privacy rights also suggested that Roe might
have effects beyond abortion itself, such as the purported right to terminate
one’s life. The relatively thin doctrinal basis of the Roe opinion, which received
abundant criticism even from pro-choice advocates, raised a difficulty that
the Court has habitually faced when it chooses to intervene on one side of a
contested social issue. The difficulty with Roe, as opposed to other controversial Court interventions such as Brown v. Board of Education, is that the
moral basis of Brown — that classifying persons differently on the basis of
race or skin color was simply erroneous and unjustifiable — seemed lacking
in Roe. Both sides in the abortion debate believed that their positions — the
state should not be able to dictate to individuals what they might choose to
do about procreation and child-rearing; or humans should not be allowed to
terminate the lives of other humans merely by labeling them as “fetuses” or
“unborn” — were morally unassailable.
Ziegler spends most of her narrative on the legal and political difficulties
that followed from the Court’s choice to decide Roe when it did and the way it
did. She alludes only briefly to a counterfactual dimension of the Roe decision.
What if the Court had chosen to ground a decision on the part of woman to
terminate a pregnancy not on “privacy,” but on equality? That basis would
have underscored the fact that when states restrict the abortion decision, they
are imposing unique burdens solely on females. It is women who become
pregnant, carry fetuses to term, and may have their own health, as well as
that of a fetus, affected by the process. When a state says to a woman, “you
must not terminate your pregnancy,” it is telling her how she needs to take
care of her body, and of a future child she is carrying, for a lengthy period of
time. It is not issuing comparable instructions to the father of the prospective
child or any of the child’s other putative relatives. And the burdens it is imposing on the woman are burdens imposed on her because she is female, and
therefore uniquely capable of carrying a fetus to term. In restricting abortion
states are, in effect, telling pregnant women what is “good” for them. They
are not communicating a similar message to males, nor are they communicating that message to women who are not pregnant. Moreover, the capacity
230
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of women to become pregnant and bear offspring is an immutable characteristic, like skin color or gender.
Thus there might have been arguments based on the Equal Protection
Clause which could have functioned as justifications for Roe. There was no
realistic possibility, at the time Roe was decided (1973), that such arguments
would have been advanced. The Court was only beginning to interpret the
Equal Protection Clause to prevent some forms of gender discrimination,
and feminism was only on the edge of becoming mainstream. In retrospect,
it might have been better for the Court to have delayed a decision on the
abortion issue while arguments premised on gender equality were percolating.
Ziegler only briefly alludes to that possibility: her focus is on the controversial
baggage of “privacy” rights that has prevented privacy from playing a more
substantial role in Court decisions and American culture at large. But it is
intriguing to speculate about what might have happened had the Court’s
abortion decisions been grounded differently.

For example, despite plaintiffs’ burden to
provide an “extensive analysis” of state law
variations, they have not explained how their
multiple causes of action could be presented
to a jury for resolution in a way that fairly
represents the law of the fifty states while
not overwhelming jurors with hundreds of
interrogatories and a verdict form as large as
an almanac.
In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch
Products Liability Litigation
174 F.R.D. 332 (D.N.J. 1997)
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To call a judgment a finding makes it none the less
a judgment. A summons is not an execution, nor an
almanac a pleading, even if called so on authority of
a court.
Nuckolls v. Irwin
2 Neb. 60, 68 (n.d., pub. 1872)

